Pakistani Terror Bases in Leepa and Neelum Valleys Under Indian Military’s Crosshairs After Pahalgam Massacre

Kashmir, India - The April 22, 2025, terror attack on a tourist group in Pahalgam which led to the deaths of 26 innocents was swiftly blamed on Pakistan-based terrorists. Indian authorities identified the perpetrators as members of The Resistance Front (a front of Lashkar-e-Taiba) and vowed to “hunt them to the ends of the earth”. India immediately pointed to “cross-border” links and Pakistan’s backing of terrorists. The massacre – the deadliest in Kashmir in 25 years – triggered a sharp diplomatic and military response by New Delhi.  

Within days India suspended the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, citing Pakistan’s failure to halt terrorism, and closed the only major land crossing at Attari-Wagah, cutting off a ₹3,900 crore India–Pakistan trade route. All Pakistani diplomats were downgraded, and their visas were revoked.  Islamabad retaliated with its own countermeasures (cancelling Indian visas, airspace closure, etc.), but India’s moves underscore how Islamabad’s alleged complicity in the attack has frayed patience.  

Terror Launch Pads in Leepa and Neelum Valleys

Indian analysts quickly turned their attention to known terrorist bases across the Line of Control. For years, Leepa Valley (in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, near Muzaffarabad) and the Neelum Valley have been cited as terror launch pads for infiltration into India.  Indeed, past Indian operations highlight this threat. In the 2016 surgical strikes (after the Uri attack), Indian commandos struck multiple camps on the Pakistani side; eyewitness accounts say they hit “safe houses believed to be used by Islamist guerrillas,” including in Leepa Valley. Similarly, after the 2019 Pulwama attack India carried out cross-LoC artillery strikes against terror camps.  

Government sources later reported that 18 terrorists were killed, and all known Jaish-e-Mohammed launch pads were destroyed in Neelum Valley during that retaliatory action. In each case, Indian military briefings stressed that these camps belonged to LeT/JeM operatives preparing to infiltrate.  Yet Pakistani posts in these valleys – long identified as terrorist staging areas – remain largely intact. (As one senior Indian officer noted after Pahalgam, Pakistan’s terror infrastructure “remains fully intact,” with LeT/JeM training camps in the hinterland and “launch pads” along the LoC still in place.)

Leepa Valley (PoJK): A rugged corridor ~40 km from Muzaffarabad, historically used by terrorists.  In 2016 India claimed commandos destroyed Pakistani posts and struck multiple points in Leepa Valley.  Villagers reported a surge of terrorists into Leepa after those strikes.  Military analysts say Pakistani army posts in Leepa have routinely sheltered Lashkar and Jaish cadre.  

Neelum Valley (PoJK): Bordering Kupwara, Neelum Valley hosts numerous JeM/LeT launch pads.  In October 2019 Indian artillery blasted these positions in retaliation for ceasefire violations; intelligence assessments confirmed several camps were demolished and terrorists killed.  

Samahni Sector (PoJK): South of Poonch district, the Samahni corridor is another infiltration route.  Pakistani posts there (in the Bhimber district) have frequently facilitated terrorist movements across to Indian Poonch.  (Indian officials point to Samahni as a staging ground, although open-source citations are limited.)  

In short, LeT and JeM training camps and launch pads dot the Line of Control in POK, many just a few dozen kilometres from Indian bases.  These are exactly the kinds of “strategic assets” that Indian security planners say Islamabad has allowed to flourish.  

Pakistan’s Terror-Supporting Posture  

For decades, New Delhi has accused Islamabad of a dual strategy: actively sponsoring jihadist groups while publicly denying involvement. Pakistani generals and officials habitually invoke Kashmir rhetorically (even calling it their “jugular vein”), but insist any terrorist infiltration is independent of the state. In recent days Pakistan’s foreign ministry flatly denied any Pakistani role in Pahalgam, dismissing accusations as a “false flag” and insisting that heavy guards on the LoC make infiltration impossible. Chief of Army Staff General Asim Munir even warned India against “misadventure,” threatening to respond “with full force” to any strike.

These denials ring hollow to Indian officials.  India routinely blames Pakistan’s ISI and army for arming and training terrorists. For example, Reuters noted New Delhi’s charge that Islamabad “funds and encourages” Kashmir militancy. Independent reports echo the Indian line: Pakistan-based groups like Lashkar and JeM have been “actively preparing” for cross-border attacks. The fact that the Pahalgam attackers included Pakistani nationals confirms the link. Internationally, bodies like the UN designate LeT and JeM as terrorist organizations supported from Pakistani territory; yet Islamabad insists it will not “transgress Pakistan’s sovereignty” to stop water flows or terrorists.

Critics say Pakistan’s military systematically shelters these networks.  Senior Indian officers privately note that all key camps for LeT/JeM remain intact across the LoC. Scholars and former officials also point to Islamabad’s practice of using proxy groups: decades of evidence (from court cases to leaked documents) show the Pakistani Army and ISI co-founded, funded and equipped jihadist cadres for operations in Kashmir and beyond.  Pakistan’s public posture of plausible deniability – even as it brazenly celebrates Islamist violence in Kashmir – has been repeatedly condemned. As one Indian analyst put it, Pakistan’s recent rhetoric is “designed to inflame domestic opinion” at home while feigning innocence internationally.  

Border Skirmishes and Military Alert  

Tensions on the ground quickly escalated after Pahalgam.  On the night of April 25–26, Pakistani Army posts opened unprovoked small-arms fire across multiple sectors of the Line of Control. Indian Army sources confirmed the ceasefire violation in Leepa Valley and nearby sectors, noting it was “post-to-post firing” and that civilians were not targeted. The Indian side “responded appropriately” with small arms, and no casualties were reported. This marked the third straight day of cross-border shooting since Pahalgam, underscoring the rapidly deteriorating ceasefire.  

Pakistan’s local media even circulated unverified claims that its troops had fired anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at Indian outposts. These reports were not confirmed by Indian authorities, who only acknowledged rifle fire.  In fact, Indian sources stress that only small-arms skirmishes have occurred so far, suggesting Islamabad is seeking to deter India with calibrated force rather than a full assault. Nevertheless, the clash triggered wide alarm. India’s Army Chief Gen. Dwivedi toured forward posts in Kashmir on April 25, while New Delhi placed security forces across J&K on high alert.

Along the international border in Jammu, Pakistan has also increased deployments.  Hindustan Times reported that Islamabad has “beefed up” its Chenab Rangers (paramilitary border troops) opposite Kathua, Samba and Jammu districts.  Posts that previously held 2–3 Pakistani rangers now have as many as 10–12 each. India’s Border Security Force (BSF) is bracing accordingly and has suspended civilian crossings at the Octroi post near Jammu city as a precaution.  Reflecting the heightened readiness, Jammu’s hospitals and other public institutions have issued emergency advisories – for example, the Government Medical College Jammu directed all staff to remain on alert and be fully prepared to meet any exigency. (Baramulla’s hospital likewise kept a 24×7 “code blue” alert for casualties.) These measures indicate that India is preparing for a possible broadening of hostilities.  

Cold Start and Possible Retaliation  

Indian defence planners have long held the Cold Start Doctrine in reserve – a concept of swift, limited incursions into Pakistan to punish terrorist infrastructure without triggering an all-out war. Leepa and Neelum Valleys lie almost directly across the LoC from Kashmir’s terrorist hotspots, making them logical corridors for such operations. One analysis notes that these valleys have “historically witnessed terrorist infiltration, artillery duels, and special forces operations,” and that India’s 2016 strike “reportedly included targets in these valleys”. In other words, these rugged passes offer access routes to terror camps that India could hit quickly.

Under Cold Start, prepositioned Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) could conceivably move into Leepa or Neelum, strike identified camps (and perhaps supporting Pakistani posts), and pull back within 48–72 hours. The doctrine explicitly emphasizes “quick, high-impact, geographically limited operations without crossing nuclear thresholds".  Applying it now would mean targeted punitive raids on the known JeM/LeT launch pads in PoK, rather than broad territorial advances.  With domestic outrage running high, New Delhi appears to be “preparing the ground for a high-risk, high-reward gambit,” aiming to neutralize terrorist sanctuaries while hoping to avoid a full-scale war. The shift of troops and exercises (e.g. recent heliborne drills in Rajasthan) also serve as decoys to draw Pakistan’s attention away from the northern front.  

None of this is publicly acknowledged by India, of course. But in security circles it is clear: after Pahalgam, India’s strategic patience has worn very thin.  Any future strike on Pakistani camps – whether in Leepa, Neelum or even Samahni – would be justified in Indian eyes as self-defence against state-sponsored terror. New Delhi has already shown a willingness to deliver “sharp, calibrated blows” in response to terror threats. Given Pakistan’s repeated backing of terrorists, many analysts see a limited Cold Start-style raid as a looming possibility.  

Strategic Countdown  

With tensions at a peak, both sides publicly profess restraint but prepare for the worst.  India’s punitive diplomatic steps (suspending the Indus Waters Treaty, sealing the Attari border, expelling diplomats) and military readiness indicate its displeasure with Islamabad’s duplicity. Islamabad, for its part, warns of “all-out war” over any Indian “misadventure” (including water issues). Pakistan’s own state media and social accounts have lashed out at India’s moves, but they largely serve to cover Pakistan’s longstanding role as a terror sponsor.

In sum, the Pahalgam attack has pushed India–Pakistan relations to a boiling point.  India insists it will “punish every terrorist and their backers.”  The next few days will be critical: will Islamabad rein in the jihadi gangs hiding in its territory, or will New Delhi launch the long-threatened strikes to dismantle them?  The presence of LeT/JeM camps in Leepa, Neelum and Samahni – and Pakistan Army posts protecting those camps – means the flashpoints for such a clash are on the maps already drawn up by both armies.  As international calls for restraint grow, Pakistan’s duplicitous support for terror could prompt the kind of swift, decisive Indian response its strategists have long envisioned.

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