Explained| A look at transformation of Russia-China ties and end of unipolarity

The name for China in Mandarin (Putonghua) is Zhong Guo. It roughly translates into 'Middle Kingdom'. The name a nation/civilisation gives oneself, grants a glimpse into how the people of that nation perceive themselves. In the Chinese mind, China is the centre of the world. Imagine concentric circles. China is the innermost circle. The farther a nation/people are from China, the less civilised they are, in the Chinese worldview. 

Classical Chinese texts have no concept of international relations based on equality. It is based on hierarchy, with China at the top. All other political entities are tributary states, or states which need to be subdued, to ensure that they become a tributary state. 

The microcosm and macrocosm

With this background in mind, it is not hard to imagine why the first leader of the People's Republic of China, found his visit to Russia extremely disorienting. Mao Zedong's first visit to Russia, or USSR to be precise, was not what he hoped it would be. After all, both nations adhered to the same ideology of Marxist Leninism. Ideological brothers. Mao expected a grand welcome. He was the one who successfully engineered a revolution in a hierarchical, confucian, traditional society. 

Mao Zedong's first visit to the Soviet Union in December 1949 was marked by his disappointment with Joseph Stalin's treatment of him. As the leader of the newly formed People's Republic of China, Mao had hoped to receive a warm welcome from Stalin and be treated as an equal partner in the socialist world. However, his experience was quite different, and Mao returned to China feeling disillusioned and marginalized.

Stalin's treatment of Mao was characterized by a lack of warmth and respect. Despite Mao's position as the leader of one of the world's most important socialist states, Stalin seemed to view him as a junior partner rather than an equal. He was often dismissive of Mao's ideas and proposals, and seemed more interested in asserting Soviet dominance than in engaging in productive discussions with his Chinese counterpart.

One incident that exemplifies Stalin's dismissive attitude towards Mao occurred during a meeting in which Mao was proposing a plan for Chinese industrial development. Stalin interrupted Mao mid-sentence, saying "Stop it. You are a student, and I am your teacher." This remark was deeply insulting to Mao, who had been a revolutionary leader for decades and had played a key role in the Chinese Communist Party's victory in the Chinese Civil War. Stalin's treatment of Mao was also reflected in the way he allocated his time. 

Mao had expected to have a private audience with Stalin soon after his arrival, but instead he was kept waiting for several days while Soviet officials made excuses and offered vague assurances that a meeting would be arranged soon. When Mao did finally meet with Stalin, it was in a large group setting that included a number of other Communist leaders from around the world. Mao was relegated to a secondary position during the meeting, and Stalin largely ignored him in favor of other leaders who he viewed as more important or more closely aligned with Soviet interests.

Mao was also disappointed by Stalin's lack of interest in some of the issues that were most important to him. For example, Mao had hoped to secure Soviet support for China's position in the Korean War, but Stalin was non-committal and did not offer the level of assistance that Mao had hoped for. Mao returned from the USSR with a sense of humiliation and resentment, which after Stalin's death and Kruschev's rise, led to the Sino-Soviet split. 

Mao and Xi's visit to Moscow, a story of contrast

President Xi Jinping arrives in Moscow Russia, for a 3 day state visit.

This visit will lay the ground work for a potential ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine

It's also important to note, President Xi doesn't have problems with stairs. pic.twitter.com/Nhlg8AKbA4

— Zhao DaShuai 无条件爱国🇨🇳 (@zhao_dashuai)

Contrast Mao's visit to Moscow with Xi's visit to Moscow. A lot has changed. The first Chinese leader's visit to Moscow and the current Chinese leader's visit to Russia is a microcosm of the relationship dynamics between the two nations. Amidst the daily noise of information, one runs the risk of missing crucial insights. During Mao's time, and for a long time after that, Moscow was the senior partner and Beijing was the junior partner. 

The meeting of Putin and Xi Jinping has started in the Kremlin.

On the video, Chinese leader's motorcade is driving through Moscow. pic.twitter.com/8GfHNXxkut

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en)

Today, even though Moscow may try to present the meeting between Xi and Putin as a meeting between equals, in reality, it is a meeting between a junior partner and a senior partner. No prizes for guessing who is the senior partner in this relationship. Russia's economy is smaller than India's. China, on a PPP basis, has the world's largest economy. The relationship between Moscow and Beijing has witnessed an inversion. 

Xi Jinping about the next presidential election in Russia (scheduled for 2024): "I am sure that the Russian people will support you in your good beginnings" pic.twitter.com/HZQOOdzlQG

— Anton Gerashchenko (@Gerashchenko_en)

Here is a picture of Xi Zhongxun, the father of Xi Jinping, at Moscow’s Exhibition of Achievements of the National Economy in 1959. Also in the picture is Guo Hongtao, who led a party purge in 1935 that targeted Xi. pic.twitter.com/xgE1FKUbSE

— Joseph Torigian (@JosephTorigian)

What explains American ambivalence?

West, or to be more precise, Washington DC's decision to adopt an antagonist policy towards Moscow, be it after the Russia Ukraine war or before it,  has only worked out in China's favour. Russia does not have an option of developing closer ties with the West. Washington DC closed that door when it chose to expand NATO towards the East. In a multipolar world, a nation like America ought to be worried about China and Russia coming together. Grand Strategy suggests that American foreign policy should be dedicated towards ensuring that two great powers in Asia do not come together. What explains American behaviour that has led to the opposite?

From unipolarity to multipolarity

Unipolarity. The US decided to expand NATO towards the East when the world was going through the unipolar moment. The US was the only great power on the globe. At a time of unipolarity, the great power has more room to do what it wants. However, that time has passed, in large part due to China's economic growth. We are witnessing a world that is moving towards multipolarity.

In fact, Xi Jinping himself said in Moscow today that "the world today is going through profound changes unseen in a century. The trend of peace, development and win-win cooperation (multi-centric international relations) is irreversible. The transition to a multipolar order is unstoppable".

It isn't just China which favours a multipolar world. Numerous other nations like India, France, all welcome a multipolar world.

Afterall, there is a reason why the former French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine once confessed that “the entire foreign policy of France … is aimed at making the world of tomorrow composed of several poles, not just one.”

The core issue is that America is still carrying on with its same old foreign policy, based on the assumption that the world is still unipolar. Numerous foreign policy thinkers like John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt have written about this.

In a recent piece published on March 7th by the Foreign Policy magazine, Stephen Walt echoed this view. "The Biden administration is striving for a unipolar world that no longer exists".  

What has China got to lose?

There is some talk about how Xi Jinping is putting China's reputation at risk, by standing beside Vladimir Putin, against whom the International Criminal Court has issued an arrest warrant. The underlying claim is that China will suffer reputational damage if it supports Russia. The truth is, none of that matters. Beijing is well aware of the fact that it was America itself, not that long ago, which issued a threat to the International Criminal Court. 

"If the court comes after us, Israel or other US allies, we will not sit quietly. We will ban its judges and prosecutors from entering the United States. We will sanction their funds in the US financial system, and we will prosecute them in the US criminal system. We will do the same for any company or state that assists an ICC investigation of Americans," the American NSA John Bolton said, in 2018.

In the relationship between China and Russia, Beijing has nothing to lose. The only question in Beijing is how much they can gain. The more isolated Moscow is from other nations, the more dependent it is on China, the more convenient it is for China. Russia remains a source of commodities which are very useful in energy generation. China, like India, is dependent on other nations for energy. The fact that Russian energy is now cheap, due to the Russia Ukraine war, is a boon for China. 

Vladimir's dilemma

Beijing does not face a dilemma. US Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, at the Munich Security Conference, warned China against providing lethal aid to Russia. However, if a report from Politico is to be taken at face value, Beijing is already supplying lethal aid to Russia. Blinken threatened Beijing with sanctions. As of now, the US has not taken any action on that front against China, other than rhetoric. The real challenge stands in front of the Russian president's face; how does he develop closer ties with Beijing, which serves Moscow's interest, without becoming too dependent on Beijing.

For much of Putin's career, time has been spent on ensuring Russia recovers from the collapse of the USSR. An unenviable task. In the aftermath of the collapse, during the notorious "shock therapy" (which was being carried out by American technocrats), many parts of Russia had to rely on moonshine as currency. Russia has certainly recovered from that position. Will Russia be able to walk on razor's edge and succeed in extracting value from its relationship with Beijing, without becoming dependent on Beijing? Only time can tell.