Russia-Ukraine Crisis: What is Steinmeier formula? Here is all you need to know

Western officials are betting newfound hope on the long-stalled Minsk peace accords in their frantic diplomatic attempt to deter Russia from launching a new invasion of Ukraine. The Minsk agreements, first negotiated in 2014 and 2015, were meant to put an end to the war in eastern Ukraine with Russian-backed separatists.

However, the contract is bitterly contested and faulty, with unclear terms that can be interpreted differently and severe unanticipated contingencies. Western officials are betting newfound hope on the long-stalled Minsk peace accords in their frantic diplomatic attempt to deter Russia from launching a new invasion of Ukraine. On the other hand, a different catchphrase has once again gotten a lot of attention: the Steinmeier Formula.

What is the Steinmeier formula?

The Steinmeier Formula is a possible strategy to re-energize talks with Russia regarding the conflict in eastern Ukraine, which has claimed the lives of over 13,000 people since 2014. Since Germany's president, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, proposed it in 2016, it has been a source of contention among political analysts, diplomats, and officials.

Ukraine and Russia signed two agreements in the Belarusian capital of Minsk in September 2014 and February 2015, overseen by France, Germany, and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to establish a cease-fire and a road map to a lasting peace in eastern Ukraine, where Kyiv's forces are fighting Russia-backed separatists who hold parts of two provinces in what is known as the Donbas.

The Minsk agreements include initiatives such as both sides pulling down forces and military equipment, Kyiv providing amnesty to combatants who have not committed severe crimes, and Ukraine holding local elections and awarding special status to territories now held by separatists. They also include the removal of all foreign armed formations, military equipment, and mercenaries from Ukrainian territory, as well as the re-establishment of Kyiv's control over the Ukrainian-Russian border in that area, where ample evidence suggests Moscow has sent troops and weapons during the ongoing conflict.

The Minsk agreements have helped to de-escalate the conflict, but they haven't put an end to it. One reason is that agreements were reached fast during the war's most tumultuous periods and were vaguely worded, allowing each signatory to interpret matters like the sequence of actions toward peace in their own way.

This is where Frank-Walter Steinmeier comes in. In 2016, Steinmeier, then Germany's foreign minister and now its president, offered a leaner, simplified version of the Minsk agreements as a chance to break the impasse. It was essentially a method to get Ukraine and Russia to agree on the timeline specified in Minsk.

In particular, Steinmeier's formula calls for elections in separatist-controlled areas to be held under Ukrainian law and under the OSCE's observation. If the OSCE finds the voting to be free and fair, the areas will be granted special self-government status, and Ukraine will regain control of its easternmost border. The formula had been spoken about but not written down until representatives from Ukraine, Russia, the rebel areas of Luhansk and Donetsk, and the OSCE signed it in Minsk on October 1.

Russia and Ukraine disagree on nearly every point in the Minsk agreements, which consist of two main documents. The first is a September 2014 cease-fire agreement, followed by a 13-point plan aimed at implementing the cease-fire and outlining steps toward a political settlement. The second is a collection of supplemental texts. The main 13-point plan, formally known as "the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreement" and abbreviated as "Minsk 2," was agreed to in February 2015, and has since been followed by a slew of diplomatic correspondence, annexes, addendums, and appendices, none of which has legal standing. 

The fact that Russia was classified as a guarantor — effectively a referee like France and Germany — rather than a party to the conflict, according to top officials and diplomats who have directly engaged in years of tortuous discussions over the pact, is a major issue. Despite the lack of legal weight behind the entire package, the UN Security Council accepted the Minsk 2 agreement on February 17, 2015, when it passed a resolution calling for its full implementation.

With the sides deadlocked and the accords stagnated in 2015 and 2016, Steinmeier recommended a series of initiatives to get the process moving again. According to the media reports, the officials and diplomats are joking that even Steinmeier doesn't know what's in the Steinmeier Formula at this time. However, the formula clearly stated that legislation on the special status of Donetsk and Luhansk would enter into force on the same day as local elections when it was initially suggested in diplomatic letters.

How do Russia and Ukraine see the Steinmeier formula?

Russia has used this to argue that holding elections and establishing special status should be the first steps in going forward with Minsk. Other elements in Steinmeier's letters, however, state that voting should be planned and held in conformity with the Constitution of Ukraine as well as in compliance with OSCE and international criteria for democratic elections, according to Ukrainian officials.

Officials in Ukraine insist that those conditions will not be reached until Kyiv reclaims control of the seized territories, journalists are given unrestricted access, and candidates from all political parties are given a free and fair chance to run. There are also various more challenges, such as the lack of voters: The current war is reported to have displaced more than 700,000 people from the affected areas. Former Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk claimed that the peace accords had been weaponized by Russia.

Putin's purpose is to have his hand in our belly fat through his interpretation of the Minsk deal, he stated at the time, Ukraine, according to Yatsenyuk, and other previous leaders in power at the time of the Minsk agreement would be more than willing to follow the accords as Kyiv interpreted them at the time. The French President, Emmanuel Macron, on the other hand, believes that Minsk is the only way for Ukraine to reclaim control of Donbas. 

Image: AP