Hard Evidence, Videos And Call Transcripts: How India Made A Solid Case To Extradite Tahawwur Rana

New Delhi: In the Certification of Extraditability and Order of Commitment dated May 16, 2023, issued by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the Court notes that the Government of India submitted evidence in support of its extradition request, including transcripts of David Headley’s testimony in the Northern District of Illinois (NDIL) case. The evidence submitted by the Indian government outlines, point by point, Tahawwur Rana’s role as an accomplice to David Headley in the planning of the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, which resulted in the deaths of 166 people.

Based on evidence submitted to US authorities and accepted in court:

Early Relationship Between Rana And Headley

Rana and David Headley (formerly Daood Gilani) met during their time at a military boarding high school in Pakistan . The two became close friends and remained in contact for many years. After high school, Rana served as a doctor with the rank of Captain in the Pakistan Army but eventually deserted. He later became a Canadian citizen, settled in Chicago, Illinois, and established several businesses, including the Immigration Law Center with offices in Chicago, New York, and Toronto.

Diverging Paths: Rana’s Career And Headley’s Criminal Background

While Rana pursued a legitimate business path, Headley became involved in heroin trafficking. He was twice convicted for drug offenses. After Headley’s 1997 arrest for importing heroin into the U.S., Rana posted his house as collateral for Headley’s bail. Throughout their friendship, Rana also held money for Headley and transferred it to him when needed.

Planning An Attack On India

Headley’s ties to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) began around 2000, when he attended his first LeT meeting, listened to jihadist speeches, donated money, and volunteered. In December 2001, he moved to Pakistan and, between 2002 and 2005, underwent multiple rounds of military, intelligence, and terrorist training from LeT. After returning to the U.S. in August 2005, Headley met Rana and shared details of his LeT training. He revealed that LeT wanted him to travel to India for surveillance and/or attack planning, and he intended to change his name to conceal his identity. In February 2006, Headley legally changed his name to David Coleman Headley and obtained a new passport.

Establishment Of Immigration Law Center In Mumbai

Headley met with LeT members who instructed him to travel to India to conduct surveillance on high-value public and government targets. To facilitate this mission, Headley and his handlers discussed opening an immigration office in Mumbai as cover. 

In June 2006, Headley met Rana in Chicago, explained his plan, and sought help in setting up the office. Rana agreed to open a Mumbai branch and assisted Headley in securing a business visa, despite knowing the application contained false information. Rana also deceived his business partner, an immigration attorney, into approving the visa documents.

Conducting Surveillance In India

Headley used his position as "Regional Manager" of the Mumbai branch to obtain a visa from the Indian Consulate. This allowed him to remain in India for extended periods. He also applied to the Reserve Bank of India to officially open the Mumbai office but was rejected. Headley still used the business as a cover, conducting surveillance, including video recordings of the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel.

Coordination With LeT And Use Of Business Infrastructure

After acquiring the visa, Headley traveled to Pakistan to inform LeT leaders that Rana had agreed to the cover story. In September 2006, Headley conducted hours of surveillance in Mumbai. At that time, a protected witness arranged accommodations for Headley on Rana’s request. Later, Headley returned to Pakistan and provided LeT with the footage and intelligence he had gathered.

Continued Surveillance And Rana’s Active Involvement

Headley returned to India several times in 2007 to gather more intelligence. He signed a lease, hired staff, and advertised the Mumbai office. Rana’s business partner falsely claimed Headley had the authority to represent the firm in India, Bangladesh , and Pakistan. The office, however, generated little to no legitimate business.

In July 2007, Headley visited Rana and stayed with him in Chicago and updated him on the surveillance operations, the video recordings, and meetings with co-conspirators. When Headley’s visa expired, Rana helped him obtain a new five-year multi-entry visa using the same false information.

Advancing The Plot And Strategic Surveillance

In December 2007, Headley saw a mock-up of the Taj Mahal Hotel at LeT’s headquarters in Pakistan. He met co-conspirators in March 2008 to discuss potential landing sites for the attackers. He conducted additional surveillance, including harbor boat trips using GPS devices, and relayed his findings to LeT.

In May 2008, Headley informed Rana about all these developments, including the mock-up, GPS mapping, and delay of the attack plan. Rana reportedly smiled and laughed at the details. That month, Headley also included Rana in emails with other co-conspirators regarding how one of Headly’s contacts in India might be useful to LeT.

Closure Of Mumbai Office And Final Preparations

In June 2008, Headley again met with LeT members who gave him further instructions and another GPS device. He was told to close the Mumbai office and place a fake job advertisement to lure former military personnel. After discussions with Rana, Headley started closing the office. However, due to lease issues, it remained open until shortly before the attacks. Headley returned to Pakistan with final videos, GPS data, and disguises for the attackers. He also informed co-conspirators of the operational status.

Forewarning And FBI Surveillance

In late 2008, Headley learned that Rana was planning to travel to India, Dubai, and China. Headley arranged for a co-conspirator to meet Rana in Dubai and warn him to avoid India, as the attack was imminent. During a conversation on September 7, 2009 (recorded by the FBI), Rana confirmed the Dubai warning.

Aftermath of The Mumbai Attacks

The Mumbai attacks occurred between November 26–29, 2008, resulting in 166 deaths and 239 injuries. In December, Headley returned to the U.S. and discussed the attacks with Rana. He mentioned the videos he had made of the attacked sites, and referring to a 1971 incident, claimed he was “even with the Indians now.”

Rana responded that the Indian people “deserved it.” On December 25, 2008, a co-conspirator emailed Headley asking how Rana was reacting to the attacks. Headley replied that Rana “is very relaxed.” In the recorded September 2009 conversation, Rana said the LeT attackers should receive Pakistan’s highest military honor, the Nishan-e-Haider, and praised one of the masterminds as deserving of a medal.

Continued Plots And Surveillance In India And Denmark

In 2009, Headley conducted further reconnaissance for potential future attacks, including a planned but foiled plot against a Danish newspaper. He also surveyed Chabad Houses in Delhi, Goa , and Pushkar, as well as the National Defence College (NDC) in India. In a recorded conversation, Rana acknowledged the NDC was a target and discussed how an attack there could result in more military casualties than previous wars. Rana set up a secure email account for Headley to communicate sensitive information and occasionally interacted directly with Headley’s Pakistani handlers.

Following years of legal proceedings and based on extensive documentary evidence, sworn testimony, and intercepted communications submitted by the Indian government, the United States Supreme Court has approved the extradition of Tahawwur Rana. Rana is scheduled to arrive in India on April 10 to face trial for his role in one of the most devastating terror attacks in Indian history.