Pakistan's Hangor Submarines: Delays, Doubts, and Dependency

Eight submarines, built with Chinese collaboration, are designed to extend underwater endurance and complicate India's strategic calculus in the Arabian Sea.

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When Pakistan commissioned PNS Hangor on 30 April 2026 in Sanya, China, with President Asif Ali Zardari and Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Naveed Ashraf in attendance,  it marked the first operational milestone in a programme that has been repeatedly and emphatically described as a game-changer for the Pakistan Navy. 

The ambition is genuine. Eight submarines, built with Chinese collaboration, are designed to extend underwater endurance and complicate India's strategic calculus in the Arabian Sea. But ambition and delivery are different things, and the Hangor programme, examined closely, raises as many questions as it answers. 

Capability is the first and most fundamental of those questions. The Hangor is an export-optimised derivative of China's Type 039A/B Yuan class, not the vessel Beijing operates in its own fleet. Export variants consistently differ from their domestic counterparts in three key areas: sensors, combat management systems, and acoustic quieting. 

No published specification confirms the export Hangor performs at Yuan-class levels, and a sober reading of the programme treats it primarily as a recapitalisation effort to replace ageing boats rather than a decisive capability shift. Pakistani officials have offered no detailed technical response to challenge that assessment. 

The operational environment compounds the capability question. India currently operates twelve P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, conducting sustained anti-submarine patrol cycles across the Arabian Sea. India has approved a further six aircraft, which would expand the fleet to eighteen and significantly increase persistent coverage across the region alongside sonar-equipped surface vessels and a growing submarine fleet. 

Analysts assess the CHD620 engine fitted to the Hangor class as likely acoustically inferior to the MTU 396 it replaced, a relevant variable in waters where India's detection infrastructure is becoming increasingly comprehensive. Whether Hangor-class submarines can survive and operate effectively in that environment is a question that has received no official public answer. 

The propulsion system is where the programme's foundational uncertainty sits. The Hangor class was designed around German MTU 12V 396 marine engines, but following a 2021 discovery that MTU engines had been supplied for use on Chinese warships in violation of the EU arms embargo, Germany blocked their export to China. 

The restriction applied to China as the manufacturing and delivery partner, not to Pakistan directly, a distinction that matters for understanding where the diplomatic failure occurred. China offered its domestically produced CHD620 as a substitute, and Pakistan accepted. 

Thailand's navy, facing the identical substitution on its parallel S26T contract, initially refused to approve the CHD620, with its Navy commander stating that "without anyone guaranteeing its quality, we can't be assured that it is really good", specifically because the engine had not been used in any Chinese submarine. 

China subsequently bench-tested the engine for more than 6,000 hours before Thailand conditionally accepted it. Pakistan has produced no equivalent public record of evaluation or independent technical validation, and no publicly confirmed operational navy, excluding possible experimental or prototype use, is known to have adopted the CHD620 for active submarine service. 

The schedule tells a similar story of the gap between projection and reality. The original bilateral plan envisaged Pakistan receiving all eight submarines across a delivery window running from 2022 to 2028 — not, as often characterised, a commitment to have all eight operational by a single 2028 deadline. Progress against that window is uneven. 

Of the four China-built boats, only PNS Hangor has been commissioned; sisters PNS Shushuk, PNS Mangro, and PNS Ghazi completed their launches across 2025 and remain in late-stage sea trials. The KSEW-assembled vessels are further behind: steel was cut for the fifth boat in December 2021, and the keel for the sixth was only laid in February 2025. 

Full fleet induction is now expected between 2028 and 2030, a meaningful slide, though well short of the mid-2030s timelines sometimes cited without an evidential basis. Pakistan has issued no formal revision to its stated schedule, no acknowledgement of the slippage, and no explanation for it. 

Cost compounds every other concern. The programme carries an estimated price tag of $4–5 billion, the largest arms export contract in Chinese military history at the time of signing — and the acquisition cost is only the beginning. 

Pakistan's 2025–26 defence allocation already stands at Rs2.55 trillion, a nearly 20 per cent increase on the previous year, being managed against Rs9.7 trillion in debt servicing obligations and active IMF supervision. Maintenance, upgrades, crew training, and long-term sustainment will extend these commitments across decades. The financial case has not been publicly made. 

Dependency shapes every element of the programme's long-term viability. Every major Hangor system--propulsion, electronics, weapons, spare parts--traces back to China, creating a structural reliance on Beijing's continued material and technical support that Pakistan's submarine arm cannot currently operate without. Any disruption to that supply chain, including diplomatic, logistical, or strategic, directly affects operational readiness. 

Taken individually, each of these concerns is manageable. Taken together, they form a pattern: a programme defined by official confidence and institutional silence in equal measure. The Hangor submarines are real, and PNS Hangor's commissioning is a genuine milestone. But investment is not capability, and capability is not readiness. 

The gap between what is being claimed and what has been demonstrated remains the defining feature of this programme. Until clear answers are provided, the questions will continue to matter more than the press releases.

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Published By : Deepti Verma

Published On: 14 May 2026 at 18:29 IST